Blitzkrieg: The Lightning War against Poland

Blitzkrieg operations were very effective during the campaigns of 1939–1941. These operations were dependent on surprise penetrations, general enemy unpreparedness and an inability to react swiftly enough to the attacker's offensive operations. It included surprise attacks, rapid advances into enemy territory, with coordinated massive air attacks, which struck and shocked the enemy as if it was struck by lightning.

The classic characteristic of what is commonly known as "blitzkrieg" is a highly mobile form of infantry and armor working in combined arms teams. (German armed forces, June 1943)

These forces would drive a breach in enemy defenses, permitting armored tank divisions to penetrate rapidly and roam freely behind enemy lines, causing shock and disorganization among the enemy defenses. German air power prevented the enemy from adequately resupplying or redeploying forces and thereby from sending reinforcements to seal breaches in the front. German forces could in turn encircle opposing troops and force surrender.

This tactic attempts to keep its enemy off-balance, making it difficult to respond effectively at any given point before the front has already moved on.

German operational theories began to evolve immediately after Germany's defeat in the First World War. The Treaty of Versailles limited any German Army to a maximum of 100,000 men, making impossible the deployment of massed troops which had characterized German strategy before the War. Although the German General Staff was also abolished by the treaty, it nevertheless continued to exist as the Truppenamt or "Troop Office", supposedly only an administrative body.

Committees of veteran staff officers were formed within the Truppenamt to evaluate 57 issues of the war. Their reports led to doctrinal and training publications, which became the standard procedures by the time of the Second World War. The Reichswehr was influenced by its analysis of pre-war German military thought, in particular the infiltration tactics which at the end of the war had seen some breakthroughs in the Western Front's trench war, and the maneuver warfare which dominated the Eastern Front.

Germany had a substantial numeric advantage over Poland and had developed a significant military prior to the conflict. The Luftwaffe (air force) provided both tactical and strategic air power, particularly dive bombers that disrupted lines of supply and communications. Historian Basil Liddell Hart claimed "Poland was a full demonstration of the Blitzkrieg theory."

Dispositions of the opposing forces on 31 August 1939 with the German plan of attack overlayed.

Polish military planners failed to foresee the speed of the German advance and predicted that Armia Prusy would need to be fully mobilized by 16 September, by which time it was too late. In late 1939, Polish analysts prepared a report, examining the faults of the Polish defensive strategy against German Blitzkrieg tactics, and proposing a solution. This report was presented to the Allies, of whom the French refused to read it. The French Army ended up fighting in 1940, not even on the "Polish schedule," but on the World War One schedule (even slower).

It was an extremely effective tactic when employed against the armies of the Allies, who were initially largely expecting a re-run of the Trenches in the First World War. The Third Reich had extensive military success in the first years of the Second World War with this strategy and conquered France, Poland and many other countries (almost) with ease.

Valeria Otarola